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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The theory of income taxation has been an important area of study in eco-
nomics. Interest in a formal theory of income taxation dates back to at least
J.S. Mill (1848), who advocated an equal sacrice approach to the normative
treatment of income taxes. In terms of the modern development, Musgrave
(1959) argued that two basic approaches to taxation can be distinguished: the
benet approach, which puts taxation in a Pareto e¢ ciency context; and the
ability to pay approach, which puts taxation in an equity context. Some of
the early literature, such as Lindahl (1919) and Samuelson (1954, 1955), made
seminal contributions toward understanding the benet approach to taxation
and tax systems that lead to Pareto optimal allocations. Although the im-
portance of the problems posed by incentives and preference revelation were
recognized, scant attention was paid to solving them, perhaps due to their
complexity and di¢ culty.
Since the inuential work of Mirrlees (1971), economists have been quite
concerned with incentives in the framework of income taxation. The model
proposed there postulates a government that tries to collect a given amount
of revenue from the economy. For example, the level of public good provi-
sion might be xed. Consumers have identical utility functions dened over
consumption and leisure, but di¤ering abilities or wage rates. The govern-
ment chooses an income tax schedule that maximizes some objective, such as
a utilitarian social welfare function, subject to collecting the needed revenue,
resource constraints, and incentive constraints based on the knowledge of only
the overall distribution of wages or abilities. The incentive constraints derive
from the notion that individualswage levels or characteristics (such as pro-
ductivity) are unknown to the government. The optimal income tax schedule
must separate individuals as well as maximize welfare and therefore is gener-
ally second best.1 The necessary conditions for welfare optimization generally
include a zero marginal tax rate for the highest wage individual. Intuitive and
algebraic derivations of this result can be found in Seade (1977), where it is
also shown that some of these necessary conditions hold for Pareto optima as
well as utilitarian optima. Existence of an optimal tax schedule for a modied
1If the government knew the type of each agent, it could impose a di¤erential head tax.
As is common in the incentives literature, one must impose a tax that accomplishes a goal
without the knowledge of the identity of each agent ex ante.
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model was demonstrated in Kaneko (1981), and then for the classical model
in Berliant and Page (2001, 2006). An alternative view of optimal income tax-
ation is as follows. Head taxes or lump sum taxes are rst best, since public
goods are not explicit in the model and therefore Lindahl taxes cannot be used.
Second best are commodity taxes, such as Ramsey taxes. Third best are in-
come taxes, which are equivalent to a uniform marginal tax on all commodities
(or expenditure). In our view, it is not unreasonable to examine these third
best taxes, since from a pragmatic viewpoint, the rst and second best taxes
are infeasible. It also seems reasonable to x the revenue requirement, given
that in many countries (such as the U.S.), the institutional national political
structure separates decisions about taxes from decisions about expenditures.
However, this will not be a requirement of our analysis below.
1.2 A Positive Political Model
The main objective of this research is to derive testable hypotheses. How can
we explain (or model) the income tax systems we observe in the real politi-
cal world? We shall attempt to answer this question with a voting model, a
positive political model, in combination with the standard income tax model
described above. As noted in the introduction of Roberts (1977), one does not
need to believe that choices are made through any particular voting mecha-
nism; one need only be interested in whether choices mirror the outcomes of
some voting process. Thus, what is described in below is an attempt to con-
struct a potentially predictive model with both political and economic content.
It contains elements of the optimal income tax literature as well as positive
political theory (an excellent survey of which can be found in Calvert (1986)).
Although much of the optimal income tax literature and most of the work
cited above deals with the normative prescriptions of an optimal income tax,
there is a relatively small literature on voting over income taxes. Most of
this literature is either restricted to consideration of only linear taxes, or does
not consider problems due to information (adverse selection and moral haz-
ard), or both. Examples that might t primarily into the linear tax category
which also involve no labor disincentives on the part of agents are Foley (1967),
Nakayama (1976) and Guesnerie and Oddou (1981). Aumann and Kurz (1977)
use personalized lump sum taxes in a one commodity model. Hettich and
Winer (1988) present an interesting politico-economic model in which candi-
dates seek to maximize their political support by proposing nonlinear taxes.
Work disincentives are not present in the model. Chen (2000) extends their
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work to the more standard optimal income tax model in the context of proba-
bilistic voting. Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Peck (1986), and Meltzer and
Richard (1981, 1983) use linear taxes in voting models with work disincentives.
Roemer (1999) restricts to quadratic tax functions with no work disincentives
but with political parties. Perhaps the model closest in spirit to the one we
propose below is in Snyder and Kramer (1988), which uses a modication of
the standard (nonlinear) income tax model with a linear utility function. The
modication accounts for an untaxed sector, which actually is a focus of their
paper. This interesting and stimulating paper considers fairness and progres-
sivity issues, as well as the existence of a majority equilibrium when individual
preferences are single peaked over the set of individually optimal tax schedules.
(Su¢ cient conditions for single peakedness are found.) Röell (1996) considers
the di¤erences between individually optimal (or dictatorial) tax schemes and
social welfare maximizing tax schemes when there are nitely many types of
consumers. Of particular interest are the tax schedules that are individually
optimal for the median voter type. This interesting work uses quasi-linear
utility and restricts voting to tax schedules that are optimal for some type.
Brett and Weymark (2017) push this further in a continuum of types model
by characterizing individually optimal tax schedules. Then they show, un-
der conditions including quasi-linear utility, that if the set of tax schedules is
restricted to individually optimal ones, the individually optimal tax for the
median voter is a Condorcet winner.
We propose in this paper to allow general nonlinear income taxes with
work disincentives in a voting model. The main problem encountered in
trying to nd a majority equilibrium, as well as the reason that various sets
of restrictive assumptions are used to obtain such a solution in the literature,
is as follows. The set of tax schedules that are under consideration as feasible
for the economy (under any natural voting rule) is large in both number and
dimension. Thus, the voting literature such as Plott (1967) or Schoeld (1978)
tells us that it is highly unlikely that a majority rule winner will exist. Is
there a natural reduction of the number of feasible alternatives in the context
of income taxation?
1.3 The Role of Uncertainty and Feasibility
The answer appears to be yes. The (optimal) income tax model has a natural
uncertainty structure that has yet to be exploited in the voting context. As in
the classical optimal income tax model, all worker/consumers have the same
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well-behaved utility function, but there is a nonatomic distribution of wages
or abilities. Suppose that a nite sample is drawn from this distribution.2
The nite sample will be the true economy, and the revenue requirement im-
posed by the government can depend on the draw. In fact this dependence is
just a natural extension of the standard optimal income tax model. In that
model, the amount of revenue to be raised (the revenue requirement in our
terminology) is a xed parameter, something that makes perfect sense since
the population in the economy and the distribution of the characteristics of
that population are both xed, and thus we can take public expenditures also
as xed. But consider now the optimal tax problem for the cases when the
characteristics of the population are unknown. That is exactly what happens
when we consider that the true population is a draw from a given distribu-
tion. In such circumstances, it is not reasonable to x the revenue requirement
at some exogenously given target level, but instead the revenue requirement
should be a function of the population characteristics.
It seems natural for us to require that any proposed tax system must be
feasible (in terms of the revenue it raises) for any draw, as no player (including
the government) knows the realization of the draw before a tax is imposed. For
example, an abstract government planner might not know precisely the top
ability of individuals in the economy, and therefore might not be able to follow
optimal income tax rules to give the top ability individual a marginal rate of
zero. The key implication of using nite draws as the true economies is that
requiring ex ante feasibility of any proposable tax system for any draw narrows
down the set of alternatives, which we call the feasible set, to a manageable
number (even a singleton in some cases).3
What is key here is not only the set of assumptions on utility or preferences,
but also assumptions concerning the revenue required from each draw. The
revenue requirement function was proposed and examined to some extent in
Berliant (1992), and is developed further in more generality in section 2 below.
We do not claim that the particular games examined here are the correct
ones in any sense. The point of this work is that there is a natural structure
2This assumption is similar to the one used in Bierbrauer (2011), though the purpose of
that work is entirely di¤erent from ours.
3Our arguments apply to nite numbers of agents. Jim Snyder has pointed out to us that
the model has a discontinuity when one goes from a nite to an innite number of agents.
In this latter case there is no uncertainty about the composition of the draw, so we do not
have a continuum of ex ante feasibility restrictions. Instead we have only that the revenue
constraint needs to be satised for the known population.
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and set of arguments that can be exploited in voting games over income taxes
to obtain existence and sometimes uniqueness and characterization results.
We then extend the analysis to an environment with incentives, along the
lines of Mirrlees (1971). At this point the assumptions on utilities used in the
optimal income tax literature alone are su¢ cient to obtain an analog of single
peaked preferences over the feasible set of alternative tax functions.
The focus of this paper is on voting over income taxes without information
transmission or opportunities for strategic behavior. We hope to address these
issues in subsequent work.
In relation to the literature that deals with voting over linear taxes, our
model of voting over nonlinear taxes will not yield a linear tax as a solution
without very extreme assumptions. This will be explained in section 5 be-
low. Moreover, our second order assumption for incentive compatibility will
generally be much weaker than those used in the literature on linear taxes;
compare our assumptions below with the Hierarchical Adherence assumption
of Roberts (1977). As noted by LOllivier and Rochet (1983), these second
order conditions are generally not addressed in the optimal income taxation
literature, though they ought to be addressed there. In what follows, we em-
ploy the results contained in Berliant and Gouveia (2001) and more generally
in Berliant and Page (1999) to be sure that the second order conditions for
incentive compatibility hold in our model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we introduce our framework
and derive some useful preliminary results in section 2. In section 3 we
examine an optimal income tax economy based on the setting pioneered by
Mirrlees (1971), where labor supply is endogenous. Of primary interest are
the existence and characterization of a majority voting equilibrium. Section
4 studies voting over both public goods and taxes. Finally, section 5 contains
conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2 The Model
2.1 Notation and Denitions
We shall develop an initial model of an endowment economy as a tool. Al-
though it might be of independent interest, our primary purpose is to apply
this model and the results we obtain to the standard optimal income tax model
in the succeeding sections.
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There is a single consumption good c and consumerspreferences are iden-
tical and given by u(c) = c, with c 2 R+. A consumers endowment, which
is also her type, is described by w 2 W  [w;w], where [w;w]  R++ is an
interval contained in the positive real line. In this section the endowment can
also be seen as pre tax income or, following classical terminology in Public Fi-
nance, the ability to pay of each agent. References to measure are to Lebesgue
measure on [w;w].
The distribution of consumersendowments has a measurable density f(w),
where f(w) > 0 a:s:4.
Let k be a positive integer and letAk  [w;w]k, the collection of all possible
draws of k individuals from the distribution with density f . Formally, a draw
is an element (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak.
In order to be able to determine what any particular draw can consume, it is
rst necessary to determine what taxes are due from the draw. Hence, we rst
assume that there is a given net revenue requirement function Rk : Ak ! R.
For each (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) represents the total taxes due
from a draw. For example, if the revenues from the income tax are used to
nance a good such as schooling, then Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) can be seen as: the per
capita revenue requirement for providing schooling to the draw (w1; w2; :::; wk)
multiplied by k.
Although we shall begin by taking revenue requirements as a primitive, in
the end we will justify this postulate by deriving revenue requirements from
the technology for producing a public good.
Assumptions on Rk will be imposed and discussed below. One basic as-
sumption that we will maintain throughout is that Rk is attainable. Formally,
Rk is attainable if for every (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak,
Pk
i=1wi > Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk).
Strict inequality is used here in preparation for the models used in Sections 3
and 4.
It is important to be clear about the interpretation of Rk. One easy in-
terpretation is that the taxing authority provides a schedule giving the taxes
4Note that f() plays almost no role in the development to follow, in contrast with its
preeminent role in the standard optimal income tax model. It may be interpreted as a
subjective distribution describing the planner beliefs about the characteristics of the agents
in the economy, but that consideration is immaterial for the model presented here. We have
implicitly assumed that the abilities are drawn independently, but since we never use this,
correlation would also be permissible. In multistage voting in a representative democracy,
the equilibria are likely to be a function of f , as is often the case in signaling games. We
expect to study that problem in the future.
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owed by any draw. There are several reasons that revenue requirements might
di¤er among draws, including di¤erences in taste for a public good that is
implicitly provided, a non-constant marginal cost for production of the public
good, di¤erences in the cost of revenue collection, and so forth.
The major point about asymmetric information in this model is as follows.
The government and the agents in the economy know the prior distribution f
of types of agents in the economy5 as well as the mapping Rk. In an endowment
economy we assume that the timing of events is such that tax functions must
be chosen before the composition of the draw is known to the voters.
Next we impose a topology on Ak. For Ak, we simply use the Euclidean
norm kkk on the subspace [w;w]k.
Before moving on to consider the game - theoretic structure of the problem,
it is necessary to obtain some facts about the set of tax systems that are
feasible for any draw in Ak or in A. These are the only tax systems that
can be proposed, for otherwise the voters and social planner would know more
about the draw than that it consists of k people (or of an unknown size) drawn
from the distribution with density f . Voters can use their private information
(their endowment) when voting, but not in constructing the feasible set. For
otherwise either each voter will vote over a di¤erent feasible set, or information
will be transmitted just in the construction of the feasible set.
An individual revenue requirement6 is a function g : W ! R that takes w
to tax liability.
Clearly, there will generally be a range of individual revenue requirements
consistent with any map Rk. Our next job is to describe this set formally. Fix
k and Rk. Let
Gk 
n
g : [w;w]! R j g is measurable, 8(w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak,
kX
i=1
g(wi)  Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk), g(wi) < wi 8i
)
Gk is the set of all individual revenue requirements that collect enough
revenue to satisfy Rk. Gk 6= ; if Rk is attainable. The restriction that
the revenue requirement be satised for each draw restricts the feasible set
signicantly.
5Actually, all they need to know is the support of that distribution.
6Even though this is simply a tax function on endowments, we will reserve the terminology
tax functionfor an environment with incentives to simplify the exposition.
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2.2 FromCollective to Individual Revenue Requirements
In order to examine the set of feasible individual revenue requirements de-
scribed above, more structure needs to be introduced. It is obvious that some
feasible gs will raise strictly more taxes than necessary to meetRk(w1; w2; :::; wk)
for any (w1; w2; :::; wk). We now search for the minimal elements of the sets
Gk.
Dene a binary relation  over Gk by g  g0 if and only if g(w)  g0(w)
for almost all w 2 [w;w]. Let
Gk  fB  Gkj B is a maximal totally ordered subset of Gkg:
By Hausdor¤s Maximality Theorem (see Rudin (1974, p. 430)), Gk 6= ;.
Finally, dene
Gk  fg : [w;w]! Rj 9B 2 Gk such that g(w) = inf
g02B
g0(w) a.s.g:
Gk is nonempty.
If g 2 GknGk is proposed as an alternative to g 2 Gk, 9g0 2 Gk that is
unanimously weakly preferred to g.
2.3 Assumptions and Preliminaries
2.3.1 Basic Assumptions
These basic assumptions will be maintained throughout the remainder of this
paper.
Next we state a natural assumption on Rk, which implies that position in
the draw (rst, second, etc.) does not matter. All that matters in determining
the revenue to be extracted from a draw is which types are drawn from the
distribution.
Denition: A revenue requirement function Rk is said to be symmetric
if for each k and for each (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, for any permutation  of
f1; 2; :::; kg, Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) = Rk(w(1); w(2):::; w(k)).
We will use the assumption that Rk is C2. That is not a strong assump-
tion. The reason is that the assumption that Rk is C2 is generic in the appro-
priate topology; that is, C2 Rks will uniformly approximate any continuous
Rk (Hirsch (1976, Theorem 2.2)).7 We will also assume that Rk is smoothly
monotonic:
7This idea is also used to justify di¤erentiability in the smooth economies literature.
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Denition: A revenue requirement function Rk is said to be smoothly
monotonic if for any (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, @Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk)=@wi > 0 for
i = 1; 2; :::; k.
This assumption requires that draws with higher ability to pay owe more
taxes. One could successfully use weaker assumptions with this framework,
but at a cost of greatly complicating the proofs.8
Finally, we shall impose the condition that w > Rk(w;w; :::; w)=k. Under
smooth monotonicity, this assumption is su¢ cient for the conclusion w >
g(w)8w 2 [w;w], so that after tax incomes are non-negative. This is important
for implementation in the optimal income tax setting. Weaker assumptions
could be used, again rendering proofs more complicated. Evidently, this
assumption is stronger than attainability.
2.3.2 Single Crossing Individual Revenue Requirements
The next step in model development is to introduce two sets of assumptions
where the elements of the set of feasible and minimal individual revenue re-
quirements Gk are single crossing,
9 i.e. each pair of gs will cross only once.10
These two sets of assumptions reect how collective revenue requirements
change with polarization of the draw, and are illustrated in Figures 1 and
2. Loosely speaking, they are opposites of one another. The rst set of
assumptions has collective revenue requirements increasing as a draw becomes
more polarized, whereas the second set of assumptions has collective revenue
requirements decreasing as a draw becomes more polarized.
We rst present an assumption that we call limited complementarity. This
assumption implies that revenue requirements are maximal for draws consisting
of at most two types of consumers. Maximal revenue draws for type w are
polarized draws, i.e. they consist of people of type w and people of the type
8One particular case ruled out is the one of constant per capita revenues. In our model
this situation implies constant individual revenue requirements, i.e. a head tax, clearly an
uninteresting situation even though it is rst-best. It can be handled as a limit of the cases
considered here. This case includes the particular situation where the government wants to
raise zero scal revenue.
9In fact, under stronger assumptions, it is possible to show that the set of feasible and
minimal individual revenue requirements is a singleton, rendering voting trivial. In that
analysis, its useful to have the size of the draw, k, unknown to the planner as well. We
omit this analysis for the sake of brevity.
10A Gk with single crossing gs generates a trade-o¤ where raising more taxes from one
type of voter allows less revenue to be raised from another type, as in the conventional
income tax model.
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most unlike w, either w or w. This is a stark way to capture the idea that higher
heterogeneity in an economy leads to higher scal revenue needs. As such, one
may nd it helpful to associate this property with some notion of convexity
of the collective revenue requirement function on each individual endowment.
The revenue requirements to be discussed thus have the properties that revenue
collection must increase with the agentsendowments and with polarization of
the distribution of endowments.
Fix k. Four conditions on g evaluated at w and w are:
C1. g(w)  Rk(w;w; :::; w)=k.
C2. g(w)  Rk(w;w; :::; w)=k.
C3. For k even:
Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk=2; wk=2+1; :::; wk) =
k
2
(g(w) + g(w)).
C4. For k odd:
Rk(w1; w2; :::; w(k 1)=2; w(k+1)=2; :::; wk)+
Rk(w1; w2; :::; w(k+1)=2; w(k+3)=2; :::; wk) = k(g(w) + g(w)).
C1 and C2 are mere feasibility conditions. C3 and C4 mean that a draw
consisting of both extreme types provides a worst case scenarioagainst which
feasibility of any upper and lower values of the individual revenue requirement
function g must be assessed.
Denition: The set of admissible extreme revenue requirements is:
EGk 

(g(w); g(w)) 2 R2+ j (g(w); g(w)) veries C1 -C4.
	
.
Dene the switching functionW : [w;w] [w;w]! fw;wg byW (w;w) 
w if w  w, and W (w;w)  w if w < w. This function denes which
extreme type is the one most unlike a given type w, either w or w, relative to
w.
Denition: A revenue requirement function Rk is said to satisfy limited
complementarity if for each (g(w); g(w)) 2 EGk there exists a switching point
w 2 [w;w] such that for all (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak the following holds:
For k even:
Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) 
kX
i=1
[Rk(w
i
1; w
i
2; :::; w
i
k) 
2
k
  g(W (wi; w))]
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where wij = wi for j = 1; :::; k=2 and w
i
j = W (wi; w
) for j = k=2 + 1; :::; k.
For k odd:
Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) 
kX
i=1
[Rk(w
ia
1 ; w
ia
2 ; :::; w
ia
k )=k+Rk(w
ib
1 ; w
ib
2 ; :::; w
ib
k )=k g(W (wi; w))]
where wiaj = wi for j = 1; :::; (k   1)=2 and wiaj = W (wi; w) for j = (k +
1)=2; :::; k and wibj = wi for j = 1; :::; (k + 1)=2 and w
ib
j = W (wi; w
) for
j = (k + 3)=2; :::; k.
Denition: A revenue requirement functionRk is said to satisfy Edgeworth
substitutability if @2Rk=@wi@wj < 0 for i 6= j.
This assumption means that the individual marginal contributions for the
revenue requirement out of a draw decline when the type of another individual
in the draw increases.
The next result establishes that requirements in Gk cross exactly once.
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Theorem 1: Let k be a positive integer. Suppose that Rk satises limited
complementarity and Edgeworth substitutability. Then, 8g 2 Gk, g is con-
tinuous and dg=dw > 0, and for any g; g0 2 Gk, there exists a ew 2 [w;w] such
that g(w) > g0(w) implies g(w) > g0(w) for all w 2 [w; ew) and g(w) < g0(w)
for all w 2 ( ew;w]. Moreover, for any g; g0 2 Gk with switching points w and
w0, respectively, g(w) > g0(w) implies w > w0. Finally, the g 2 Gk that
minimizes g( bw) has a switch point w = bw.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark: Given the assumptions on Rk and the fact (proved in the Ap-
pendix) that
g(wi) = Rk(w
i
1; w
i
2; :::; w
i
k) 
2
k
  g(W (wi; w))
for k even, we have that each g(w) has at most one non-di¤erentiable point,
which is at the switch point w. A similar result holds for k odd.
One class of functions for which limited complementarity and Edgeworth
substitutability hold is given by the CES family:
Rk(w1; :::wk) = k1 1=p
 
kX
i=1
wpi
!1=p
where p  1 and  <

w + w
2w
(p 1)=p
.
11This is the analog of condition (SC) of Gans and Smart (1996).
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A particularly striking example of a case satisfying limited complemen-
tarity is given by the following collective revenue requirement function12 and
illustrated in Figure 1.
Rk(w1; :::wk) =  
kX
i=1
jwi   wM j+  
kX
i=1
wi,
where wM is the median of the draw, 0 <  <  < 1, and =(1   ) <
w=(w   w).13
The Appendix contains a proof that limited complementarity holds for this
case. The individual revenue requirement functions take the form:
g(w) =   w +   ( ew   w) if w < ew and
g(w) =   w +   (w   ew) if w  ew
Figure 1 about here
In this case, the two branches of the function are linear and the marginal
requirement is thus always higher for the taxpayers with higher ability to pay.
We now look at a second case that implies single crossing of revenue re-
quirement functions in Gk.
Denition: A revenue requirement function Rk(w1; :::wk) is argument-
additive if Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk)  Q(
kX
i=1
wi). Let Q0 denote
dQ
d
X
wi
.
Theorem 2: Let k  2 and let the revenue requirement functionRk(w1; w2; :::; wk)
be argument-additive with Q00 < 0. Then, we have that 8g 2 Gk, g is as fol-
lows:
For ew  (w + w)=2, g 2 Gk implies:
A) g(w; ew) = Q(k ew)=k+Q0(k ew)  (w  ew) if w  ew+(k 1)  ( ew w).
12Although this example is not di¤erentiable, it is simple and it has the basic properties
leading to our result. It is monotonic in wi and veries a weaker version of Edgeworth
substitutability: as other ws in the sample increase, the incremental requirement of a given
wi either stays the same or decreases (the latter when it goes from above to below the
median).
13These constraints on parameters ensure that the individual revenue requirement function
is strictly increasing and that it doesnt exceed the budget of a consumer.
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B) g(w; ew) = Q((k 1)w+w)  ((k 1)=k) Q(k ew) + (k 1) Q0(k ew) 
( ew   w) if w > ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w).
For ew < (w + w)=2, g 2 Gk implies:
C) g(w; ew) = Q(k ew)=k+Q0(k ew)  (w  ew) if w  ew  (k 1)  (w  ew)
D) g(w; ew) = Q((k 1)w+w)  ((k 1)=k) Q(k ew) + (k 1) Q0(k ew) 
( ew   w) if w < ew   (k   1)  (w   ew)
where ew 2 [w;w]. Thus, dg(w; ew)=dw > 0 except at a nite number of
points. Furthermore, 8w 2 [w;w], g(w; ew) is single caved14 in ew and attains
a minimum at ew = w. Finally, any pair of gs in Gk will cross once: for
any g; g0 2 Gk, there exists a ew; ew0 2 [w;w], ew < ew0 such that g(w) > g0(w)
implies g(w) > g0(w) for all w 2 [w; ew), g(w) = g0(w) for all w 2 [ ew; ew0] and
g(w) < g0(w) for all w 2 ( ew0; w].
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark: Notice that the notion of single crossing used in Theorem 2 is
weaker than the notion used in Theorem 1. Thus, we will use the notion
of single crossing from Theorem 2 below. The implication of our feasibility
approach in this case is that feasible tax functions turn out to be parameterized
by ew. The intuition for this result is quite simple, as can be seen in Figure
2. Consider (for the moment) the case where the distribution of endowments
is not bounded above or below. Since the revenue requirement Q is concave,
so is the per capita revenue requirement Q=k. But then, only the tangents
to Q=k can be tax functions, since any linear combination of taxes has to be
greater than or equal to the per capita requirement. The ews correspond to the
arguments of the per capita revenue functions at the tangency points. Figure
2 shows two possible individual revenue requirements corresponding to ew = w1
and ew = w2. The statement of the theorem is slightly more complex because
this intuition may not work near the limits w or w.
Note that the marginal rates in branch B are lower than the rate in branches
A and C (the tangent branches), that in turn is lower than those in branch D.
We can also relate this result to the intuition provided earlier for the limited
complementarity case. In the argument-additivity case, concavity implies that
per-capita revenue requirements decrease with the polarization of the sample.
14A function f is single-caved if  f is single peaked.
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Figure 2 about here
Such a result supports the idea that existence of a political equilibrium
determining the shape of tax schedules does not necessarily imply a given pat-
tern of taxation. Notice also that the shape of the distribution of endowments
does not have in itself su¢ cient information to predict the shape of the in-
come tax schedules chosen by majority rule. Revenue requirements Rk are
also important.15
3 Voting Over Taxes in an Optimal Income
Tax Economy
Having dispensed with preliminaries, we now turn to the voting model with
incentives based on Mirrlees (1971). The objective here is to show that we
can design a tax function on (endogenous) income implementing revenue re-
quirements dened on the underlying (and unobservable) endowments. Given
this, we can translate the results obtained for an endowment economy to the
environment with incentives.
The two goods in the model are a composite consumption good, whose
quantity is denoted by c, and labor, whose quantity is denoted by l. Consumers
have an endowment of 1 unit of labor/leisure and perhaps an endowment of
consumption good. u(c; l) is the utility function of all consumers, where u is
twice continuously di¤erentiable. Subscripts represent partial derivatives of u
with respect to the appropriate arguments. The parameter w, an agents type,
is now to be interpreted as the wage rate or productivity of an agent. Thus
wi is the value of agent is endowment of labor. The gross income earned by
agent i is yi = wi  li and it equals consumption when there are no taxes.
The following assumptions are maintained throughout the remainder of this
paper:
A1: Standard assumptions on preferences:
u1 > 0; u2 < 0; u22 < 0; u11 < 0.
A2: The utility function is strictly quasi-concave:
u11  u22   2u12  u1  u2 + u22  u21 < 0.
15With these preliminary results in hand, it would be possible to prove that a majority
rule equilibrium exists for the endowment economy. Since this not our main aim, for the
sake of brevity it is omitted.
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A3: Consumption is normal:
u21  u2   u22  u1 > 0.
A4: Leisure is normal:
u11  u2   u12  u1 > 0.
A5: Boundary conditions:
limc!0 u1(c; l) =1, liml!1 u2(c; l) =  1, liml!0 u2(c; l) = 0.
Assumptions A1, A3 and A4 imply A2 but they are listed separately for
convenience. Assumptions A1, A2, and A5 are standard. Assumption A3 is
generally used in the optimal income tax literature to obtain the single crossing
property for indi¤erence curves. Assumption A4 is also common in the optimal
income tax literature and is used to derive comparative statics there. The last
part of A5 helps to ensure the existence of interior solutions.16 Although these
are strong assumptions, they seem necessary to obtain a tractable model. As
mentioned in the introduction, they are weaker than assumptions used in the
earlier literature in this area, such as quasi-linear preferences. Let y 2 R be
individual gross income. A tax system is a function  : R! R that takes y to
tax liability. A net income function  : R ! R corresponds to a given  by
the formula (y)  y   (y).
First we discuss the typical consumers problem under the premise that the
consumer does not lie about its type, and later turn to incentive problems. A
consumer of type w 2 [w;w] is confronted with the following maximization
problem in this model:
max
c;l
u(c; l) subject to w  l   (w  l)  c with  given,
and subject to c  0, l  0, l  1.
For xed  , we call arguments that solve this optimization problem c(w)
and l(w) (omitting ) as is common in the literature. Dene y(w)  w  l(w).
Next the production correspondence is dened formally. Let Ik = [0; 1]k.
For each (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, production possibilities are described by a set
Yk(w1; w2; :::; wk), where Yk(w1; w2; :::; wk)  IkR. For a given (w1; w2; :::; wk),
(l; C) 2 Yk(w1; w2; :::; wk) describes labor input li  l(wi) of person i, along
with net output C in consumption good of the economy.
Notice that labor inputs are measured as positive numbers, and that labor
inputs of those not in the draw (w1; w2; :::; wk) are zero. We assume throughout
16See Seade (1977,1982). A5 is used in our paper in the proof of Theorem 3.
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that the endowment of consumption good of a draw as well as tax revenue due
from a draw are independent of labor supply l and composite consumption
good output C. As is almost universal in the optimal income tax literature, a
constant returns to scale technology is postulated. Formally,
Yk(w1; w2; :::; wk) 
(
(l; C) 2 Ik  Rj
kX
i=1
wi  li  C +Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk)
)
.
This structure captures some important aspects of the optimal income tax
model. First, labor is modeled as a di¤erentiated product, so workers with dif-
ferent characteristics can have di¤erent wages (or productivities). Second, the
production set can embody initial endowments of both labor and consumption
good on the part of consumers, as well as revenue collections required by the
government from any draw.
Here we assume that the revenue requirement function Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) 
0. This assumption is not strictly necessary but avoids the need to deal with
a few technical problems. More discussion of this assumption can be found in
Berliant and Gouveia (2001). One implication of this restriction is that the
political process modeled here is best thought of as a cost sharing process rather
than one of explicit redistribution. Foley (1967) used a simple endowment
economy to prove that there is no majority rule equilibrium when voting over
explicitly redistributional taxes. This nonexistence can be overcome if we
place strong restrictions in the policy space, which typically means linear tax
functions. This is precisely the kind of restriction we are trying to avoid. On
the other hand, we should keep in mind that most government expenditures
are exhaustive, that is they represent purchases of goods and services rather
than transfers. Our model is geared to explaining the distribution of the tax
burden nancing these exhaustive expenditures.
For a given tax system, the labor income of each agent is observed by
all, but the wage rate and hours worked of each agent are known only to the
agent himself. This is an explicit statement of the information structure of the
model.
Denition: Fix k and a revenue requirement function Rk. The set of
feasible tax systems is dened to be
Tk 

 : R! Rj is measurable, and for all (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak;
kX
i=1
(y(wi))  Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk)
)
17
Finally, the notion of a majority rule equilibrium can be dened. Fix a revenue
requirements function Rk. A majority rule equilibrium for draws of size k is
a correspondence Mk : Ak ! Tk such that for every (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, for
every  2 Mk((w1; w2; :::; wk)) (with associated y(w)), there is no subset D
of fw1; w2; :::; wkg of cardinality greater than k=2 along with another  0 2 Tk
(with associated y0(w)) such that
u(y0(w)  0(y0(w)); y0(w)=w) > u(y(w) (y(w)); y(w)=w) for all w 2 D: (1)
We will show that we can restrict attention to continuous  .
Next, some results from the literature on optimal income taxation and
implementation theory are used to construct the best income tax function
that implements a given individual revenue requirement. The discussion will
be informal, but made formal in the theorems and their proofs.
The problem confronting a worker/consumer of type w given net income
schedule  is maxl u((w  l); l). The rst order condition from this problem
is u1  ddy  w + u2 = 0, where subscripts represent partial derivatives of u with
respect to the appropriate arguments. Rearranging,
d
dy
=  u2((w  l); l)
u1((w  l); l) 
1
w
.
For this tax schedule, we want the consumer of type w to pay exactly the
taxes due, which are g(w) for some g 2 Gk. If g is strictly increasing, g is
invertible. If we assume (for the moment) that g(w) is continuously di¤eren-
tiable, then g 1, which maps tax liability to ability (or wage), is well-dened
and continuously di¤erentiable. Substituting into the last expression,
d
dy
=  
u2(;
y
g 1(y ))
u1(;
y
g 1(y ))
 1
g 1(y   )  (; y). (2)
As in Berliant (1992), a standard result from the theory of di¤erential
equations yields a family of solutions to this di¤erential equation.17 Berliant
and Gouveia (2001) show that (2) has global solutions if g  0.
17The method used above originates in the signaling model in Spence (1974), further de-
veloped by Riley (1979) and Mailath (1987). Equation (2) is best seen as dening an indirect
mechanism where gross income is the signal sent by each agent to the planner, much as in
Spences model education is the signal sent to the rm. However, nding the equilibria of
this game is only part of the problem. The remaining part of the problem relates to imple-
mentation. By this we mean that the social planners problem is to dene reward/penalty
functions that induce each type of agent to choose, in equilibrium, the behavior the planner
desires of that type of agent. A reference closer to our work is Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984).
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Of course, as LOllivier and Rochet (1983) point out, the second order
conditions must be checked to ensure that solutions to (2) do not involve
bunching, which means that consumers do optimize in (2) at the tax liability
given by g.18 This was done in Berliant and Gouveia (2001), and more generally
in Berliant and Page (1999), where the Revelation Principle19 was used to
construct strictly increasing post tax income functions (w) = y(w)   g(w)
that implement g(w), where g0(w) > 0. Since we then have that y(w) is
invertible, we immediately obtain (y) = (w(y)) and (y) = g(w(y)).
It is almost immediate from this development that the set of solutions to
(2) for a given g is Pareto ranked. We focus on the best of these for each given
g. Dene
T k  f j is a solution to (2) for some g 2 Gk, (y) = y   (y),
and  Pareto dominates all other solutions to (2) for the given gg .
Theorem 3: If Gk is a set of continuous, increasing functions that are
twice continuously di¤erentiable except at a nite number of points, then for
any k and any  2 Tk there is a   2 T k such that the utility level of each
agent under   is at least as large as the utility level of each agent under  and
such that the marginal tax rate for the top ability w consumer type under  
is zero.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark: The theorem says that any non-negative and feasible revenue
However, there is a di¤erence between our results and the other literature on implementa-
tion using the di¤erentiable approach to the revelation principle. The di¤erence is that in
the other literature the principal cares only about implementing the action proles of the
agents (labor supply schedules in our model). In contrast, we consider the implementation
of explicit maps from types to tax liability. That is, the principal cares about agentstypes,
which are hidden knowledge. These maps from types to tax liability are not action proles,
and are motivated by the ability to pay approach in classical public nance. They play the
same role here as reduced form auctions play in the auction literature.
18That is, we have a separating equilibrium.
19In (2) the planner rst chooses a net income function (y), the agents then take the
chosen net income function as given and maximize utility by selecting a gross income level y
(or the corresponding level of labor supply). This is the implementation approach described
in La¤ont (1988). The Revelation Principle allows us to write an equivalent mechanism
where agents are simply asked to report their type w. It is easier to check second order
conditions of the problem for this direct mechanism. They essentially say that both pre and
post tax incomes should be increasing functions of w. In our case they are strictly increasing
functions and there is no bunching.
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requirement function can be implemented by a continuum of tax schedules.
These tax schedules are Pareto ranked and furthermore a maximal tax schedule
exists.
Remark: Note that when g(w) is C2 so is   (see Berliant and Gouveia
(2001)). Furthermore, when we have non-di¤erentiability of g at w,   is C1:
simple computations show that both the right-hand and left-hand derivatives
of (y) at y = y(w) are equal to 1 + u2(y    ; y=w)=(u1(y    ; y=w)  w).
We begin by characterizing a class of individual revenue requirements for
which we will be able to obtain results. This class corresponds to the cases dis-
cussed in Theorems 1 and 2 and may possibly include other sets of assumptions
on collective revenue requirements.
Denition: A collection E of functions mapping [w;w] into R is called
strongly single crossing if each g 2 E is:
1. Continuous.
2. Twice continuously di¤erentiable except possibly at a nite number of
points.
3. dg=dw > 0 except possibly at a nite number of points.
4. Individual revenue requirements cross each other only once, i.e. for any
pair g; g0 2 E, there exists a ew; ew0 2 [w;w], ew < ew0 such that g(w) >
g0(w) implies g(w) > g0(w) for all w 2 [w; ew), g(w) = g0(w) for all
w 2 [ ew; ew0] and g(w) < g0(w) for all w 2 ( ew0; w].
Lemma 1 proves that when individual revenue requirements are strongly
single crossing, the income tax systems in T k cross at most once.
Lemma 1: Let k be a positive integer. Suppose that Rk implies strongly
single crossing minimal individual revenue requirements, Gk. Let  ; 
0 2
T k , and let y(); y0() be the gross income functions associated with  and  0,
respectively. For incomes y1; y2; y3 2 y([w;w]) \ y0([w;w]), y1 < y2 < y3,
(y3) < 
0(y3) and (y2) >  0(y2) implies (y1)   0(y1).20
Proof: See the Appendix.
With this result in hand we now state the central theorem of this paper.
20Outside of y([w;w]), for instance,  can be extended in an aribitrary fashion subject to
incentive compatibility, for example in a linear way.
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Theorem 4: Let k be a positive integer. Suppose that Rk implies strongly
single crossing minimal individual revenue requirements, Gk. Then for any
draw in Ak, the one stage voting game has a majority rule equilibrium, namely
8(w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, Mk(w1; w2; :::; wk) 6= ;.
Proof: See the Appendix.21
Strongly single crossing is used intensively to prove this. It has the im-
plication that induced preferences over tax systems appear to have properties
shared by single peaked preferences over a one dimensional domain. The win-
ners will be the tax systems most preferred by the median voter (in the draw)
out of tax systems in T k .
Notice that the proof of Theorem 4 characterizes the set of majority rule
equilibria for each draw. It will be interesting to investigate the comparative
statics properties of the equilibria. This will require the imposition of further
conditions on the utility function. Also, notice that Theorem 4 is immediately
applicable to the cases delineated in Theorems 1 and 2:
Theorem 1(IC): Let k be a positive integer. Suppose that Rk satises
limited complementarity and Edgeworth substitutability. Then for any draw
in Ak, the one stage voting game has a majority rule equilibrium.
Theorem 2(IC): Let k  2 and assume thatRk(w1; w2; :::; wk) is argument-
additive with Q00 < 0. Then for any draw in Ak, the one stage voting game
has a majority rule equilibrium.
4 Simultaneous Voting Over a Public Good
and Taxes
The public goods nanced by the revenue raised through the income tax are
usually excluded frommodels of optimal income taxation due to the complexity
introduced. In the model considered here, voting over a public good is already
captured to some degree on the revenue side, since Rk varies with the draw of
21The proof consists of two parts. The rst part shows that there is a tax schedule that
is weakly preferred to all others by the median voter. The second part shows that this tax
schedule is a majority rule winner. This second part could be replaced by Gans and Smart
(1996, Corollary 2). But it would take as much space to verify the assumptions of that
Corollary as it does to prove our more specialized result directly.
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types and hence with the production of public goods for these types. Where it
is not captured is in the utility functions of agents, where public goods should
appear explicitly. Suppose that a public good, with some given cost function,
is included in the model and incorporated in utility functions. Let x 2 R+ be
the quantity of the public good.22 Let the cost function for the public good in
terms of consumption good be H(x), which is assumed to be C2.
Let Fk : Ak ! Tk  R+ be a correspondence dened by:
Fk((w1; w2; :::; wk)) 
(
( ; x) 2 Tk  R+ j
kX
i=1
(y(wi))  H(x)
)
.
In this case, a straightforward extension of our denition of majority rule
equilibrium is the following: a majority rule equilibrium for draws of size k
is a correspondence Mk mapping (w1; w2; :::; wk) into Fk((w1; w2; :::; wk)) such
that for every (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, for every ( ; x) 2 Mk((w1; w2; :::; wk))
(with associated y(w)), there is no subset D of fw1; w2; :::; wkg of cardinality
greater than k=2 along with another pair ( 0; x0) 2 Fk((w1; w2; :::; wk)) (with
associated y0(w)) such that u(y0(w)    0(y0(w)); y0(w)=w; x0; w) > u(y(w)  
(y(w)); y(w)=w; x; w) for all w 2 D.
We will now use ideas inspired by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) to obtain
a unique Pareto optimal level of public good for each draw, so the revenue
requirement function is well-dened.23 Let utility be given by a C2 function
u(c; l; x; w) = ac+b(l; w)+r(x;w).24 We assume that @b=@l < 0, @2b=@l2 < 0,
@r=@x > 0, @2r=@x2 < 0. It is assumed that dH(x)=dx > 0 and d2H(x)=dx2 
0. Let (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak, and let ci and li denote the consumption and
labor supply of the ith member of the draw respectively. Then production
possibilities are given by:
kX
i=1
wi  li  
kX
i=1
ci  H(x): (3)
We dene interior allocations to be vectors (< ci >ki=1; < li >
k
i=1; x) >> 0.
A pair ( j; xj) is interior if the resulting allocation25 is interior.
22We write u(c; l; x; w) for the utility function.
23Revenue requirement correspondences are too di¢ cult to handle at this stage of model
development.
24In this case we are also using w as a taste parameter. That interpretation is quite
common in both the optimal tax literature and the literature on self-selection.
25The allocation results when the agents in a draw each solve their consumer problem.
See Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) for an explanation of why we need to restrict the analysis
to interior allocations.
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Lemma 2: Under the assumptions listed above, for any given draw
(w1; w2; :::wk), for all interior ( j; xj); (h; xh) 2Mk, xj = xh.
Proof: The Pareto optimal allocations are solutions to: maxu(c; l; x; w1)
subject to u(c; l; x; wi)  ui for i = 2; 3; :::k and subject to (3) where the
maximum is taken over ci, li, (i = 1; :::; k) and x. Restricting attention to
interior optima, we have the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for this problem:
kX
i=1
1
a
 @r(x;wi)=@x = dH(x)=dx. (4)
Since this equation is independent of ci and li for all i, the Pareto optimal
level of public good provision is independent of the distribution of income and
consumption for the given draw. Given our assumptions on r and H, there is
a unique level of public good that solves (4).
Q.E.D.
For the class of utility functions dened above we can thus solve for x as
an (implicit) function of (w1; w2; :::; wk), and obtain the revenue requirement
function Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk)  H(x(w1; w2; :::; wk)).
A simple example where equation (4) can be solved explicitly for x is
given by the cost function H(x) = m  x and preferences over the public good
Rk(x;wi) = wi  (x   x2), which (for interior solutions) generate the revenue
requirement
Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) =
m 
kX
i=1
wi  m2  a
2
kX
i=1
wi
.
This case constitutes an example where the revenue requirements satisfy the
conditions of Theorem 2(IC), namely concavity and argument-additivity. A
majority rule equilibrium exists for any given sample size.
In general, it is di¢ cult to trace the properties of the revenue requirement
function back to the structure of both the cost functionH(x) and the subutility
function r(x;w). However, we now show that the case where both primitive
functions are isoelastic has a simple solution that, given reasonable values
for the parameters, veries the conditions for existence of a majority rule
equilibrium.
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Theorem 5: Let u(c; l; x; w) = a  c   b(l; w) + rw
1 x
1 , and let H(x) 
m  x, with  > 1,   1. Then for any draw in Ak, the one stage voting
game over interior ( ; x) has a majority rule equilibrium.
Proof: See the Appendix.
A reason why the isoelastic case might be interesting comes from the fact
that it is a suitable case for the purpose of carrying out empirical tests of
the model, given that the correct way to aggregate abilities (or tastes) in this
particular case is simply to sum them.
The Appendix contains an example of interest.
To compute the e¢ cient level for the public good in a Bergstrom-Cornes
economy, one need only maximize the sum of utilities over the feasible set.
The revenue requirement function is the cost of providing this level of the
public good. Even though a condition such as limited complementarity are not
always veried, for the cases where they hold we obtain existence of a majority
rule equilibrium when voting occurs simultaneously over income tax functions
and levels of public good provision. This result is considerably stronger than
existing results where the tax functional form is taken as given and voting
occurs over the value of one parameter of the tax function.
5 Conclusions
Two di¤erent but related issues deserve some discussion at the outset. The rst
is whether information on the likelihood of each draw can be used. The second
is how to deal with possible excess revenues. As for the opposite situation of
insu¢ cient revenues, the reader should note that imposing a penalty for not
meeting the requirement simply results in a new revenue requirement function.
We rst discuss the information issue. One obvious possibility would be to
dene as feasible all individual revenue requirement functions that generate an
expected revenue equal to or larger than the collective revenue requirement for
the expected draw. The problem with this notion is that single crossing condi-
tions would likely fail to be satised for most cases including the ones studied
in this paper. But one could consider weakening our feasibility restriction and
still have enough biteto generate single crossing gs. Here is suggestion:
One option is to use a class of revenue weighting functions and constrain the
expectation of weighted revenues. Expected revenue would be one particular
member of this class. The class could be chosen to generate a continuum of
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constraints, binding enough for the single crossing result to survive, and we
would be back to our initial setup although with weaker feasibility conditions.
This is similar to a model of government behavior using ambiguity aversion or
Knightian uncertainty. Perhaps this could be justied as a way to aggregate
risk averse voter preferences over budget decits.
We now address the issue of excess revenue. Even though our example
illustrating Theorem 1 generates exactly the revenues needed, that will not
generally happen and excess revenue will be raised in most cases. Consider rst
how this point might apply to the economies included in Theorem 5. There,
it is possible to return the ex post excess revenue in a lump-sum fashion, as
there are no income e¤ects. It is not true that one might want to reduce the
amount of the public good produced to prevent the welfare loss caused by
excessive revenue: in this case the structure of preferences is such that any
decrease in public good provision will result in recontracting afterwards, so as
to get the unique Pareto optimal level of the public goods. Reducing revenue
requirements cannot possibly lead to better resource allocations ex post.
When we consider general preferences and technologies the problem be-
comes more di¢ cult. Clearly, the excess revenue cannot be returned to tax-
payers in a lump sum fashion, as it will a¤ect their behavior in optimizing
against the income tax. In the more general case, there will be a trade-o¤
between decreasing the public good level for some draws and, at the same
time, decreasing revenue requirements. However, once we deviate from the
type of example used in Theorem 5, other issues would arise before we get to
this point, most importantly the presence of multiple Pareto optimal levels of
public good provision. From the point of view of applications, analysis of these
more general models will be much more di¢ cult.
The real question is whether the alternative models have more to o¤er. Is
it better to restrict ourselves to xed revenue and voting over a parameter of
a prespecied functional form for taxes (as in the previous literature), which
are also generally Pareto dominated, or is the model proposed here a useful
complement? Di¤erences of opinion are clearly possible.
We note here that unlike much of the earlier literature on voting over
linear taxes, the majority equilibria are not likely to be linear taxes without
strong assumptions on utility functions and on the structure of incentives.
The reason is simple: in the optimal income tax model, Pareto optimality
requires that the top ability individuals face a marginal tax rate of zero.26
26We know of only one case where an optimal tax is linear: Snyder and Kramer (1988).
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All majority rule equilibria derived in Section 3 of this paper are second best
Pareto optimal (for a given individual revenue requirement), and hence satisfy
this property. Hence, poll taxes are the only linear taxes that could possibly be
equilibria. In our model, such taxes are not generally majority rule equilibria,
since consumers at the lower ability end of the spectrum will object.
In that sense, the results obtained here are a step forward relative to Romer
(1976) and Roberts (1977). In another sense, they also improve on Snyder and
Kramer (1988) by using a standard optimal income tax model as the framework
to obtain the results.
There are a few strategies that may be productive in pursuing research
on voting over taxes. One strategy is to use probabilistic voting models such
as in Ledyard (1984). Another is to take advantage of the structure built in
this paper and, with our results in hand, look at multi-stage games in which
playersactions at the earlier stages might transmit information. Of course,
it might be necessary to look at renements of the Nash equilibrium concept
to narrow down the set of equilibria to those that are reasonable (at least
imposing subgame perfection as a criterion).
A two-stage game of interest is one in which k is xed and each player in
a draw proposes a tax system in T k (simultaneously). The second stage of the
game proceeds as in the single stage game above, with voting restricted to only
those tax systems in T k that were proposed in the rst stage.
A three stage game of interest is one in which k is again xed and the
players in a draw elect representatives and who then propose tax systems and
proceed as in the two stage game (see Baron and Ferejohn (1989)).
Work remains to be done in obtaining comparative statics results. As seen
from the examples, that can be a complex task. Finally, the predictive power
of the models will be the subject of empirical research. That will certainly be
the focus of future work.
But this and other results derived in that paper are due to the use of a peculiar model that
departs signicantly from the other models used in the study of income taxation. There
are no income and substitution e¤ects on e¤ort induced by taxation up to the point where
workers switch to the underground sector, and from that point on the same holds since, by
denition, income realized in the underground sector is not taxed.
26
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We present the proof for k even. Adaptation of the proof for the case when k is
odd is straightforward. Here we use the notation introduced in the denition
of limited complementarity.
Fix g 2 Gk. By assumption, Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) 
kX
i=1
[ 2
k
Rk(wi1; wi2; :::; wik) 
g(W (wi; w))]. Since g is feasible, g(wi)  2k Rk(wi1; wi2; :::; wik) g(W (wi; w))
for each i. If g(wi) > 2k  Rk(wi1; wi2; :::; wik)   g(W (wi; w)) for some i, then
g is not minimal in the sense that g =2 Gk, which is a contradiction. Hence
g(wi) =
2
k
 Rk(wi1; wi2; :::; wik)   g(W (wi; w)) and in particular g(w) = 2k 
Rk(w
; w; :::; w) g(w) = 2
k
Rk(w; w; :::; w) g(w).27 Hence g is continuous.
Moreover, since Rk is smoothly monotonic, dg=dw > 0.
Let g; g0 2 Gk, with switching points w and w0. Suppose without loss
of generality that g(w) > g0(w). Since g and g0 belong to EGk, we have that
g(w) < g0(w). Since g   g0 is a continuous function dened over a connected,
domain the intermediate value theorem says that it must have at least one
zero. Take ew as one such case. Assume that ew  w, ew  w0. Then
0 = g( ew)   g0( ew) = g0(w)   g(w) < 0, a contradiction. Now assume thatew  w, ew  w0. Then 0 = g( ew)   g0( ew) = g0(w)   g(w) > 0, another
contradiction. Hence, either w > ew > w0 or the reverse must hold. Assume
the former. Over the open interval (w0; w) we have:
d(g0   g)
dw
=
2
k
 [@Rk(wi; :::; wi; w; :::; w)
@wi
  @Rk(wi; :::; wi; w; :::; w)
@wi
> 0
by Edgeworth substitutability. Since the di¤erence is increasing we have that
there is a single zero, i.e. the revenue requirements g and g0 cross only once.
Now assume w0 > ew > w. Then, over (w; w0), d(g0 g)
dw
is negative (again
by Edgeworth substitutability), contradicting continuity since we started with
g(w) > g0(w) and g(w) < g0(w).
Notice that this proof of single crossing of the individual revenue require-
ments also proves that g(w) > g0(w) =) w > w0.
Finally, suppose we have g and bg in Gk, with switching points w andbw respectively. By the previously mentioned result, g(w) > bg(w) =) w >bw =) g( bw)   bg( bw) = bg(w)   g(w) > 0. Similarly, g(w) < bg(w) =) w <
27Otherwise either g is not minimal or g is not feasible.
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bw =) g( bw)   bg( bw) = bg(w)   g(w) > 0, proving the last statement in the
Theorem.
Q.E.D.
6.2 An example satisfying limited complementarity
For the sake of brevity, we consider the case of k even. Dene wM as a median
of (w1; w2; :::wk), namely if w1; w2; :::wk is ordered in a non-decreasing fashion,
wM 2 [wk=2; wk=2+1]. We have that:
Rk(w1; w2; :::wk) =  
kX
i=1
jwi   wM j+  
kX
i=1
wi,
and 0 <  <  < 1 as well as =(1  ) < w=(w   w).
The adding-up restriction (C3 in this case) is as follows:
2
k
Rk(w; ::; w; w; :::; w) =   (w   w) +   (w + w) = g(w) + g(w).
From the denition of limited complementarity, since the worst case sce-
nario for type w is when wM = W (w;w), the minimal feasible individual
revenue requirements with switch point w are:
g(w;w) =   (w +W (w;w)) +   jw  W (w;w)j   g(W (w;w)). (5)
In particular we have that
g(w;w) =  (w+w)+  jw wj g(w) =  (w+w)+  jw wj g(w).
Thus,
g(w) =   (w + w) +   (w   w)    (w + w)    (w   w) + g(w)
=   (w   w) +   (w + w)  2w + g(w)
Setting w = w and substituting for g(w) in (5), we obtain g(w;w) =
  w +   (w   w). Using the adding-up restriction, we obtain g(w;w) =
w+(w w). Hence g(W (wi; w);w) = W (wi; w)+jw W (wi; w)j.
We now check feasibility, which says:
Rk(w1; w2; :::wk) =  
kX
i=1
jwi   wM j+  
kX
i=1
wi
 2
k

kX
i=1
k
2
 jwi  W (wi; w)j+  
kX
i=1
(wi +W (wi; w
)) 
kX
i=1
g(W (wi; w
)).
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This can be simplied to:
kX
i=1
jwi   wM j 
kX
i=1
jwi  W (wi; w)j  
kX
i=1
jw  W (wi; w)j.
Now use the denition of W (w;w) to rewrite the expression above as:
kX
i=1
jwi   wM j 
X
wiw
[(wi   w)  (w   w)] +
X
wi<w
[(w   wi)  (w   w)],
resulting in
kX
i=1
jwi   wM j 
kX
i=1
jwi   wj.
Since the median wM is the parameter relative to which the sum of the
absolute deviations is minimized we have that the inequality above necessarily
holds. Furthermore we have that it holds as an equality when w = wM . Since
that will be a majority rule outcome we have that, in this particular instance,
the sum of the individual tax payments matches exactly the collective revenue
requirement.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward to prove by direct calculation that 8g(w; ew) 2 Gk as given
in the Theorem, g(w; ew) is continuously di¤erentiable in each of w and ew and
is strictly increasing in w. Since Rk is argument-additive, Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) =
Q(
kX
i=1
wi) = Q(k  wA), where wA is the average ability in the draw.
Next focus on branches A and C of the Theorem. Since Rk is concave, on
these branches,
g(w; ew) = Q(k  ew)=k +Q0(k  ew)(wA   ew)  Q( kX
i=1
wi)=k.
This shows that the branches A and C in the statement of the Theorem are
feasible. We now prove that they are minimal. Consider branch A. Clearly,
if a draw consists of k individuals of type ew, g( ew; ew) is minimal. To show
that g(w; ew) is minimal, suppose the opposite. Take h(w) to be minimal,
with h( ew) = Q(k  ew)=k and h(w)  g(w; ew) with strict inequality for some
w1 2 [w; ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)]. It is feasible to have a draw (w1; w2; :::wk)
with mean ew and wi 2 [w; ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)] for i = 1; 2; :::k. Then,
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Rk(w1; w2; :::wk) = Q(k  ew) = kX
i=1
g(wi; ew). But kX
i=1
h(wi) <
kX
i=1
g(wi; ew), so
h(w) is not feasible. Similar reasoning holds for branch C.
Now consider branch B and w1 2 ( ew + (k   1)( ew   w); w]. The logic used
for branches A and C does not hold in this case: it is not possible to nd k 1
ability levels in order to construct a draw with mean ew. Consider a draw with
wj 2 [w; ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)] for j = 2; 3; :::k. Due to argument-additivity,
for any xed draw mean wA, we can take all wjs (j = 2; 3; :::; k) to be equal
to bw = (k  wA   w1)=(k   1), without loss of generality. Feasibility requires
g(w1; ew) + (k   1)  g( bw; ew)  Q((k   1)  bw + w1).
Take this as an equality and replace g( bw; ew) by
Q(k  ew)=k +Q0(k  ew)  ( bw   ew)
to obtain:
g(w1; ew) = Q((k 1) bw+w1) (k 1)=kQ(k ew) (k 1)Q0(k ew)( bw  ew) (6)
By construction, this revenue requirement is minimal (particularly at bw = ew).
Next, notice that
(k   1)  bw + w1 > (k   1)  bw + ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)
 (k   1)  w + ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w) = k  ew
Since Q is concave,
(k   1) Q0((k   1)  bw + w1) < (k   1) Q0(k  ew)
Hence, expression (6) is maximized over bw 2 [w;w] at bw = w, so feasibility
requires
g(w1; ew) = Q((k 1) w+w1)  (k 1)=k Q(k  ew)+(k 1) Q0(k  ew)  ( ew w).
It is easy to prove that allowing for draws with di¤erent compositions, namely
more than one ability in the interval [ ew+ (k  1)  ( ew w); w], does not violate
feasibility. We thus obtain branch B in the statement of the Theorem. Branch
D is obtained following similar reasoning.
Next, suppose there is h 2 Gk that is not of the form given in the statement
of the Theorem. Then there is some w 2 [w;w] with h(w) < g(w). Then
k  h(w) < k  g(w;w) = Q(k  w), implying that h is not feasible.
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To prove single cavedness in ew, one need only di¤erentiate g(w; ew) with
respect to the parameter ew. For branches A and C we obtain:
@g(w; ew)
@ ew = Q00(k  ew)  k  (w   ew).
The derivative above is positive if w < ew and negative for w > ew.
For branch B we have:
@g(w; ew)
@ ew = k  (k   1) Q00(k  ew)  ( ew   w) < 0.
which applies only for w > ew.
Finally, for branch D we get:
@g(w; ew)
@ ew = k  (k   1) Q00(k  ew)  ( ew   w) > 0.
which applies only for w < ew.
These results imply that arg min ew g(w; ew) = w. Furthermore, we claim
that these gs are single crossing. To see this, rst note that from the denition
of g(w; ew) in the statement of the Theorem, direct calculation yields that
@g(w; ew)
@w
is weakly decreasing in ew for each w. Therefore, if g(w; ew) and g(w; ew0)
cross twice, there exist w;w0; w00 2 [w;w], w < w0 < w00 such that g(w; ew) =
g(w; ew0), g(w0; ew) 6= g(w0; ew0), g(w00; ew) = g(w00; ew0). But this cannot happen
in each case: ew0 = ew, ew0 < ew, ew0 > ew.
Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Fix  2 Tk. If y(w) is the gross income function associated with  , theneg(w)  (y(w)) 2 B for some B 2 Gk. Pick g(w) 2 B \ Gk. If g(w) is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, the remainder of the proof follows from Berliant
and Gouveia (2001), Propositions 1 3.
Now suppose there exists one w such that dg=dw jw or d2g=dw2 jw does
not exist or is not continuous. Dene two segments of g, g1(w) and g2(w), on
the intervals W 1  [w;w] and W 2  [w; w], respectively.   and  over W 2
are again given by results in Berliant and Gouveia (2001), Propositions 13.
Using the results in the proof of Proposition 1 in Berliant and Gouveia (2001),
there is an extension of  (and consequently of  (y)) through (w; (w))
implementing g overW 1. By construction, incentive compatibility holds within
both segments and since w is common to both intervals any solution to (2)
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that Pareto dominates   over W 1 must necessarily violate global incentive
compatibility.
The general problem with a nite number of non-di¤erentiable points is
solved by using repeatedly the technique above.
Q.E.D.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 128
Let g and g0 be the elements of Gk associated with  and 
0, respectively. The
proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exist incomes y1 < y2 < y3 with
(y1) < 
0(y1), (y2) >  0(y2) and (y3) <  0(y3). Then by the intermediate
value theorem applied to utility di¤erences as a function of w, there exists wa
such that u(y(wa)  (y(wa)); y(wa)=wa) = u(y0(wa)   0(y0(wa)); y0(wa)=wa),
y0(wa) > y(wa),  0(y0(wa)) < (y0(wa)) and (y(wa)) <  0(y(wa)). Moreover,
g(wa) = (y(wa)) <  0(y(wa)) and since y0(wa) > y(wa), g0(wa) > g(wa).29
There also exists wb > wa with u(y(wb)   (y(wb)); y(wb)=wb) = u(y0(wb)  
 0(y0(wb)); y0(wb)=wb), y(wb) > y0(wb), (y0(wb)) >  0(y0(wb)) and  0(y(wb)) >
(y(wb)). Hence (y0(wb)) >  0(y0(wb)) = g0(wb) and since y(wb) > y0(wb),
g(wb) > g0(wb).
Using strongly single crossing, g(w) > g0(w).
By construction of T k , (y(w)) > 
0(y0(w)). Note that since the mar-
ginal tax rate at y(w) and y0(w) is zero, what we have are essentially lump
sum taxes at the top ability level. Hence, u(y0(w)    0(y0(w)); y0(w)=w) >
u(y(w) (y(w)); y(w)=w). Normality of leisure implies y(w) > y0(w). More-
over, continuity of  implies (y0(w)) >  0(y0(w)) Since  0(y(wb)) > (y(wb)),
there exists y0(w) > y > y(wb) with (y) =  0(y), so there exists wc with
u(y(wc)   (y(wc)); y(wc)=wc) = u(y0(wc)    0(y0(wc)), y0(wc)=wc), y0(wc) >
y(wc),  0(y0(wc)) < (y0(wc)) and (y(wc)) <  0(y(wc)). As above, g(wc) <
 0(y(wc)) and since y0(wc) > y(wc), g0(wc) > g(wc).
This contradicts strongly single crossing. So the hypothesis is false, and
the lemma is established.
Q.E.D.
28To see how this critical proof works, it is useful to draw the graphs from optimal taxation,
net income as a function of gross income, that are standard in the literature; see Seade (1977).
29d=dy = dg=dw  dw=dy > 0 holds because dg=dw > 0 and dw=dy > 0 is proved in
Proposition 1 of Berliant and Gouveia (2001).
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6.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Denition: Let C1 be the space of continuously di¤erentiable functions (with
domain [w;w] and range R) endowed with the uniform topology. We consider
T k to be a subset of this space by extending any  2 T k to the whole domain,
if necessary, in a C1 and linear fashion.
Fix  2 T k . First we claim that 0  d=dy  1. The rst inequality
holds because d=dy = dg=dw  dw=dy, and dg=dw > 0 (except possibly at a
nite number of points) by assumption whereas dw=dy  0 is demonstrated in
the course of proving the implementation result, Proposition 1, in Berliant and
Gouveia (2001), so it holds except possibly at a nite number of points (see the
proof of Theorem 3). Since, in spite of the exceptions at nitely many points,
 will be C1, 0  d=dy. The second inequality can be written d=dy  0,
which reduces to d=dw  dw=dy  0. As before, dw=dy  0, and d=dw  0
is demonstrated in the same place as dw=dy  0. (Note that d=dw > 0 is the
second order condition for incentive compatibility in this model.) So every 
2 T k is Lipschitz in income with constant 1, and thus T k is equicontinuous.
Since k  g(w)  Rk(w;w; :::; w)  0, T k is also norm bounded by w. Using
Ascolis theorem (see Munkres (1975, p. 290)), T

k (the closure of T

k in C
1) is
compact.
Fix k and let (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 Ak. For any  2 Tk, let v( ; w) = maxy u(y 
(y); y=w), the utility induced by the tax system  for type w. It is easy to
verify that for each w, v( ; w) is continuous in its rst argument.
Let   be a maximal element of T

k using v(; wM) as the objective, where
wM is the median ability level in (w1; w2; :::; wk) if k is odd, and wM 2
[wk=2; wk=2+1] (where the wage rates are ordered in an increasing fashion) if
k is even. Using Theorem 3,   2 T k .
Now suppose there exists  2 Tk such that there is a subsetD of fw1; w2; :::; wkg
with v( ; w) > v( ; w) for all w 2 D and where the cardinality of D is greater
than k=2. Then using Theorem 3, we can take  to be in T k without loss
of generality. Using Lemma 1,  and  are single crossing, or alternatively,
their after tax income functions are single crossing. Thus, there exist inter-
vals W;W 0  [w;w] such that W and W 0 partition [w;w] and D  W . Let
W be the smallest interval (in the sense of set inclusion) such that W and its
complement are both intervals, W and W 0 partition [w;w], and D  W .
Then by denition of  , wM =2 W . Hence D cannot contain a majority
of the draw, a contradiction. Hence the hypothesis is false and   cannot be
defeated by any other feasible tax system.
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Q.E.D.
6.7 Proof of Theorem 5:
Using Lemma 2 and (4), the unique interior Pareto optimal level of x is given
by
xPO =
"
r
am
kX
i=1
wi
# 1
+ 1
,
which implies
Rk(w1; w2; :::wk) = m 
"
r
am
kX
i=1
wi
# 
+ 1
. (7)
Since  +  > 1,  > 1, Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) is concave and argument-additive.
The remainder of the proof follows from Theorem 2(IC).
Q.E.D.
6.8 An Example of Theorem 5
Set  = 3,  = 2, r = 1, so u(c; l; x; w) = a  c   l2   w  x 2=2, and let
H(x)  mx2. Then, from (7), we have
Rk(w1; w2; :::; wk) = m 
"
1
2am

kX
i=1
wi
# 1
2
.
Concavity and argument-additivity hold so, if we rule out bankruptcy prob-
lems, there is a majority rule equilibrium. Next we apply Theorem 2.
Since we can actually index all admissible gs by their ews, to nd the choice
of the median voter wM we need only solve the problem: min ew g(wM ; ew). The
solution to this problem is obtained when wM = ew. Take w 2 [1; 2]. Suppose
we have a draw where k  2 and the median voter is the type w = 1:5. Hence,
by Theorem 2, we have that
g(w; ew) = m
2a
 1
2 

(
ew
k
)
1
2 +
1
2
(k ew)  12 (w   ew) .
For notational simplicity dene  =
 
m
2ak
 1
2 . The majority equilibrium tax
function implements the individual revenue requirement function
g(w) =  

(1:5)
1
2 +
1
2
 (1:5)  12  (w   1:5)

.
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Applying equation (2) and d
dy
= 1   d
dy
, the income tax function is given
by the solution to:
d
dy
= 1  2y
aw2
= 1  2y
a
h
2

 (1:5) 12   1:5
i2 ,
with upper boundary at ( ; y) =
 
  7
31=223=2 ; 2a

.
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